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Abstract
The intent of the patent system is to encourage innovation by granting the innovator exclusive
rights to a discovery for a limited period of time: with monopoly power, the innovator can recover the
costs of creating the innovation which otherwise might not have existed. And, over time, the resulting
innovation makes everyone better oﬀ. This presumption of improved social welfare is considered
here. The paper examines the impact of patents on welfare in an environment where there are large
numbers of (small) innovators — such as the software industry. With patents, because there is
monopoly for a limited time the outcome is necessarily not socially optimal, although social welfare
may be higher than in the no-patent state. Patent acquisition and ownership creates two opposing
incentives at the same time: the incentive to acquire monopoly rights conferred by the patent spurs
innovation, but subsequent ownership of those rights inhibits innovation (both own innovation and
that of others). On balance, which eﬀect will dominate? In the framework of this paper separate
circumstances are identiﬁed under which patents are either beneﬁcial or detrimental to innovation
and welfare; and comparisons are drawn with the socially optimal level of investment in innovation.
1 Introduction.
Patents have existed since the late Middle Ages. In England, Edward III granted a patent for Woolen
weaving in 1331 to John Kempe of Flanders. Henry VI granted a patent for the manufacture of colored
glass in 1449. In this period, one major purpose in issuing patents was to stimulate growth of new
manufacturing,1 but the potential for patents to encourage innovation was also understood. The Venetian
Senate voted a patent law governingall classes of inventioninto existence in 1474, giving patent protection
for 10 years, with free access to the government. According to the preamble to the law [30]: “We have
among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover ingenious devices ... . Now, if provisions were
made for the works and devices discovered by such persons, so that others who may see them could
not build them and take the inventors honor [sic] away, more men would then apply their genius, would
discover, and would build devices of great utility to our commonwealth.”
Thus, by the end of the Middle Ages, at least, the use of patents to encourage the creation of new
inventions and discoveries and to promote general welfare was recognized. In the New World, patents
were granted by colonial governments. Massachusetts granted a patent for a new way of making salt in
1Henry VI granted a stained glass making patent to a glass maker from Flanders, John of Utynam, with a view to
developing glass making in England. In this case, the purpose of the patent was to encourage local development of a known
procedure.
11641. That year the colonial legislature of Massachusetts enacted a law asserting that no monopolies
(exclusive rights) would be granted [1], with the exception of new inventions “proﬁtable to the country,
and that for a short time.” The ﬁrst American patent was granted in 1790, and the ﬁrst French patent in
1791. By the late 1800’s, most European countries had patent laws in place. The importance attached
to patents in the United States can be seen from the fact that the ﬁrst ones issued were signed by George
Washington, Thomas Jeﬀerson and Edmund Randolph (the ﬁrst Attorney General). Article 1, section 8
of the United States Constitution (ratiﬁed in 1788) gave Congress the power “To promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries.” After some chaos in developing procedures, the Patent Act of
1836 established the Patent Oﬃce as a separate bureau of the State Department, later (1926) to become
a bureau of the Commerce Department.2
One widely noted reason for patent protection is that research costs may be recouped, hence encour-
aging research and development. A leading example of this kind is drug development where considerable
investment outlay is required (for example to conduct clinical trials). The patent system also provides
a means for independent inventors to participate in discovery and innovation. But, despite the long
history of patents, the eﬃcacy of patents in promoting innovation is still intensely debated. Because
a patent confers a monopoly right, concern with the granting of patents has existed from the earliest
times. Rulers granted patents as a (cost-free) means of payment for service, sometimes granting patents
for procedures such as the making of salt or soap where the method of manufacture was already well
know. In response to dissatisfaction with the patent system, Queen Elizabeth I issued a proclamation
in 1601, allowing any individual to challenge a patent in court.3 These concerns were also present in
the United States. At the time of drafting the constitution, Jeﬀerson expressed concern to Madison in
a letter dated July 31, 1788 [28]:
“...... The saying there shall be no monopolies lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is
spurred on by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of 14 years; but the beneﬁt even
of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression.”
So, for almost as long as they have existed, careful reﬂection led to an equivocal view of patents involving
an inseparable mixture of good and bad — with the prevailing belief that patents sped up the rate of
innovation, and the beneﬁts from this outweighed the monopoly cost associated with the creation of
temporary monopoly.
In those times, the concern was explicitly with monopoly power. While the problem of monopoly
is well understood, there are many ways in which the assignment of monopoly rights through a patent
generate unforseen consequences.4 The literature on patents is extensive and spans not only economic
issues but also the role and operation of the legal system and the patent oﬃce which generates and
administers patents. To a substantial extent, the functioning of the patent system depends on the
2See [33] for a broad review of the history and patent literature to the present. A primer on the economics of patents
is given in [23] and more detailed discussion in [33].
3See, for example [7], for a discussion of patent history and such issues.
4For example, strategic use of patents to preempt or “hold-up” a competitor or area of development frequently occurs [7].
Similarly, strategies such as the threat of costly litigation may be used to extract unwarranted rents.
2eﬃcacy of these institutions to allocate rights and incentives correctly. Many important issues relate to
these institutions (such as the general quality of patents issued by the patent oﬃce and the ability of
the courts to assess the legitimacy of patent claims) and will not be discussed here. (See, for example,
[20], [21], and [22].) In this paper, primary focus is on the fundamental question of the tradeoﬀ between
spurred innovation and monopoly costs, leaving aside the many other issues relating to incentives, proper
assignment of rights, and so on. In this idealized context one can consider and evaluate the role and
functioning of the patent system on a theoretical basis; focusing on the question of whether and to what
extent the system provides encouragement to innovate — the central motivation for issuing patents.
Conventional wisdom on the role of the patent system is that the granting of exclusive use of dis-
covery for a limited period encourages innovation, and the value of this in the long run outweighs the
ineﬃciencies associated with temporary monopoly power over the discovery. Yet, many consider this a
largely unproven belief. One early and diﬀerent view of incentives in this context sees competition as the
key force behind innovation [15]: innovators gain market share, so the need to survive places continuous
pressure on ﬁrms to innovate. In this Schumpeterian view, it is the absence of protection that drives
ﬁrms to innovate. In the area of medical research, see [9], [14], and the references cited therein for a
mixed assessment of the value of patents. (See [8] for a recent and broad ranging critique of the patent
system, and the notion of intellectual property more generally.) Concerning software patents, Bessen
and Hunt [11] conclude that in the software industry there appears to be little correlation between the
rate at which ﬁrms invest in R&D and the rate of innovation. The impact of patents may depend
substantially on the ﬁeld of application: Bessen and Hunt identify the chemical industry as one where
patents may be important in the decision to conduct R&D. Thus the balance of costs and beneﬁts is
still the subject of intense debate; and the intent of this paper is to address this matter, comparing the
beneﬁt from spurred invention against the temporary monopoly costs incurred.
While the use of (voluntary) licencing potentially permits broad application of new discovery imme-
diately, this depends on the feasibility of such agreements. And, one may appeal to the Coase theorem
to assert that where gains are possible, licencing agreements will be reached. However, in practice, with
a multiplicity of “players”, unclear ownership rights or breadth of patent, the potential use of hold-up
tactics to extract rents, the complexity, time and expense of legal resolution, and so forth, the expec-
tation of a Coase-style resolution may be wishful thinking. The study of such issues will not be taken
up here. This paper considers the question of whether the welfare cost from temporary monopoly is
greater or less than the welfare gains from increased innovation spurred by the monopoly rights granted
by patents. And, in examining this tradeoﬀ, the research here is concerned with the impact of patents
in a speciﬁc class of environments with features similar to that of the software industry.
In the speciﬁc case of software development there are a number of notable features. Development is
typically in small incremental steps involving the combination or modiﬁcation and extension of existing
ideas. Work is highly correlated across developers because, for example, a program will typically make
use of many diﬀerent techniques so that overlap is natural. Furthermore, development proceeds in a
sequential and incremental manner, typically at a rapid pace. And, because entry costs to writing
software are very low,5 there are very many individuals and companies working in the ﬁeld. What is the
5Although, in certain circumstances, such as the development of operating systems that scale to large multiprocessor
3impact of patenting on societal welfare and on the rate of innovation in an industry with these features? In
contrast to some areas of innovation (such as drug or microchip development, for example) where patents
are prevalent, in the area of software capital costs are relatively low and, as mentioned, development
can be highly correlated, even contemporaneous.6 The impact of patents in software development has
been studied elsewhere: Bessen and Maskin [12] consider environments where innovation is sequential
and complementary — successive innovation builds on what has gone before in a sequential way and
innovation is complementary in the sense that the probability of success in discovery is improved when
more ﬁrms pursue research. Diﬀerent innovators follow diﬀerent routes of research and in this setting
they show how patents can actually inhibit innovation by limiting imitation that spurs the development
of further innovation. They focus on the case where there are a small number of competing innovators.
In contrast, here the environment is one with a large population.
An outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the environment and provides some remarks
on the recent history of software patenting. Section 3 develops a model for this and similar industries.
The welfare implications of the patent system are considered in detail in section 4. Section 5 considers
the consequences of changing patent length and highlights the impact of access to the innovation of
others on the marginal product of investment and the manner in which such knowledge correlates with a
ﬁrms’ own technology in terms of payoﬀ impact. Depending on these features, patents may either reduce
or raise social welfare (although they never lead to the socially optimal level of innovation). Section 6
concludes.
2 The Environment.
In certain notable areas such as drug development considerable investment outlay is required (for example
to conduct clinical trials). This appears as an argument in favor of patent protection: research costs
may be recouped, hence encouraging research and development. In the class of environment discussed
here, notably the software environment, development follows a very diﬀerent pattern. Development is
typically in small incremental steps and proceeds in a sequential manner. Work is highly correlated
across developers: for example, a program will routinely make use of many diﬀerent techniques so that
overlap is natural. Development routinely involves the combination or modiﬁcation and extension of
existing ideas and computer code and the pace of development is rapid. Entry costs to the software
industry are usually very low, so there are very many individuals and companies working in the ﬁeld,
from small one-person companies, to large corporations.7
computers, signiﬁcant hardware investment and related support may be important.
6In such environments, it becomes more diﬃcult to unravel competing ownership rights and so the legal rights of
the patentee may be clouded, or there may be multiple entities with rights to various components of a program or
implementation of an idea. In such circumstances, the detailed operation of the patent oﬃce and the court system is
central to any attempt to disentangle rights and claims. However, this paper is not concerned with such important matters
that require separate consideration. The intent here is to explore the basic question of the social value of patents.
7The current linux kernel under development (2007, version 2.6.22) has over 900 developers, averages 4 changes per
hour, has over 8 million lines of code and runs on 1 to 4096 processor computers.
42.1 Software and patents.
Until the early 1980’s software was not patentable, but around this time (in 1983), the USPTO gradually
extended the notion of patentability to include equipment whose only novel feature was the use of
computer software to manage the equipment. One of the earliest software patents was issued for a
rubber curing process, whereby a program monitored the temperature during the curing process.8 Over
time, software became patentable in the United States in standalone form and now almost any software
application is patentable. Business methods in particular have received attention with such high proﬁle
patents as the “One-Click” patent of Amazon. Mathematical procedures have also been patented. Patent
6,434,582 provides an algorithm for computing the cosine of a “relatively small angle”; patent 6,078,938
provides a procedure for solving systems of linear equations. This contrasts with expectation. In the
mid 1970’s the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works wrote, regarding
patents: “Even if patents prove available in the United States, only the very few programs which survive
the rigorous application and appeals procedure could be patented”.9 In the twenty-two year period
since the USPTO began issuing software patents, 150,000 patents were issued. In contrast, the (long
established) pharmaceuticals industry received 80,000 patents in that period [27].10 Given this rapid
expansion in the number of patents granted, it is natural to revisit the question of how the system aﬀects
the pace of investment and innovation, and examine the overall impact on societal welfare.
3 The Model.
The model considers a single market supplied by many ﬁrms. Firms are diﬀerentiated by their (cost)
eﬃciency which depends on own technology and the prevailing state of the art that is publicly available
for use. We assume that ﬁrms protect own technology improvements through patenting, so that only
the technology of a ﬁrm that is beyond the patent life is available for use by competitors. Demand may
depend on the state of technology, so that technological improvements can push demand up over time.
The discussion abstracts from some important issues: it is assumed that only “genuine” innovations
are patented, and all such innovations are patented. Patent holders do not licence innovations but
exploit them as monopolists until patent expiry. (See section 5.3.1 for some additional comments.) In
this framework, the merits of patenting stand or fall on whether or not monopoly for a limited period
of time has the overall eﬀect of encouraging innovation, relative to the no-patent environment. Because
the market does not internalize fully the beneﬁts of innovation there is scope for welfare improvement
through incentives to encourage innovation — a point brieﬂy illustrated in section 5.3.1. However, the
study of welfare improvement by particular policy schemes is not considered here.
8Essentially, the program implemented the Arrhenius equation — an equation relating the rate of a chemical reaction
to the temperature. k = Ae
(−
Ea
R×T ) where k is the rate coeﬃcient, A is a constant, Ea is the activation energy, R is the
universal gas constant, and T is the temperature (in degrees Kelvin).
9Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, 1978, chapter 3: Com-
puters and Copyright, p17.
10It is widely believed that the standard for obtaining a software patent is low [20], so that a large number of patents
issued could not survive close scrutiny.
53.1 The Model: Main Features
The technology of each ﬁrm evolves over time. At any point in time, a ﬁrm has a ﬁxed technology,
has access to technologies that are publicly available, and makes investment decisions that aﬀect its
future technology. Aggregating individual behavior gives the aggregate distribution over technology and
investment and determines the evolution of the distribution on technology over time. These details are
described next.
3.1.1 Technology.
An enterprise is characterized by its technology α ∈ A, where A is an ordered space, with order  .11
This formulation permits a large set of technologies and, in particular, allows diﬀerent ﬁrms to have
diﬀerent strengths and weaknesses. The distribution of technologies in the market is denoted  , or  t
to denote the distribution of technologies at time t: a probability measure on A. If α and α′ are in the
support of  t, they represent two technologies in operation at time t. They are comparable if α   α′ in
which case α is a better ﬁrm that α′ in every way; but in general technologies may not be comparable
(neither α   α′ or α′   α). Let
µt = { τ}
−∞
τ=t = ( t      0  −1    ) = ( t      t−ℓ+1 ; t−ℓ      0  −1    )
denote the sequence of past technology distributions over time. With patent length ℓ, technologies
{ t−ℓ−j}j≥0 are available for public use at time t: any technology in the support of  t−l−j may be used
by a ﬁrm. At period t, technologies older than ℓ are available for use by all ﬁrms: apart from technology
α, only technologies in the support of distribution  t−ℓ or older may be used by ﬁrm α. All innovations
are patent protected but not licensed.
3.1.2 The Firm
Firms supply a market with demand Pd(Q µ) reﬂecting the assumption that new technology raises
demand. If demand depends only on current technology, then Pd(Q µt) = Pd(Q  t), and this will be
assumed.12 Firms are distinguished by technology in two ways: own technology enters the cost function
directly, and the history of aggregate technologies is also observed.
The cost function of an enterprise depends on its current technology, α, the history of technologies,
µ, and patent length: c(q α µ ℓ). Assume that c is weakly decreasing in α and weakly increasing in
ℓ: better private or public technology can only lower cost.13 In this notation, the argument ℓ identiﬁes
11A is an ordered topological space where the relation   is reﬂexive (α   α); transitive (α   α′ and α′   α′′ imply
α   α′′); and antisymmetric (α   α′ and α′   α imply α = α′). (For example: A = {α | α : [a b] → ℜ  α measurable}
where α′   α if α′(x) ≥ α(x)  x ∈ [a b].) If technology were characterized by a real number, the ﬁrm with the largest α
would be the best ﬁrm, unequivocally, eliminating the possibility for diﬀerent ﬁrms to have area speciﬁc strengths.
12It may be more realistic to consider a model where diﬀerent technology vintages are viewed as separate markets with
newer technologies possibly having higher demand growth. However, this would greatly complicate the welfare analysis.
Here, ﬁrms with poorer technologies will suﬀer relatively lower proﬁt, so that the investment incentives are similar.
13If the patent length, ℓ, lies between two periods, τ and τ − 1, let (ℓ − [τ − 1]) τ + (τ − ℓ) τ−1 be the most recent
publicly available technology. The corresponding cost may have the form (ℓ −[τ − 1])c(q α  τ ℓ)+(τ −ℓ)c(q α  τ−1 ℓ).
6the (ℓ + 1)th element of the list µ as publicly usable. Since a ﬁrm cannot use patented technology,
c(q α µt ℓ) does not depend on ( t      t−ℓ+1). In particular, a variation in aggregate behavior at
time t (aﬀecting the aggregate distribution in subsequent periods), has no impact on cost in period t+j
if j < ℓ — since the aggregate distribution at dates closer to t than t−ℓ do not aﬀect the cost at time t.
And, if the distribution of technologies improves every period, any technology present at time t − ℓ − 1
will be dominated by a technology present at period t − ℓ. In these circumstances, the cost function
has the form c(q α  t−ℓ). This will be assumed throughout, but to maintain notational consistency
with usage elsewhere, the notation c(q α µ ℓ) will apply — with the understanding that the ℓth element
of µ aﬀects cost. Finally, assume that better publicly available technology can only improve cost: if
 ′
t−ℓ <  t−ℓ
14 then c(q α  ′
t−ℓ) ≤ c(q α  t−ℓ). In terms of µ notation, given µt = ( t  t−1    ) and
µ′
t = ( ′
t  ′
t−1    ), if  ′
t−ℓ <  t−ℓ, then c(q α µ′
t ℓ) ≤ c(q α µt ℓ).
At output q and price p proﬁt is:
π(p q µ α ℓ) = pq − c(q µ α ℓ) 
so that proﬁt maximization gives15
p − cq(q µ α ℓ) = 0 
with solution q(p µ α ℓ) and corresponding proﬁt, π(p µ α ℓ). Given p, these functions depend only on
 t−ℓ through µt. At price p, total supply is Qs(p µ ℓ) =
R
q(p µ α ℓ) (dα) when the current aggregate
distribution is  . Let Ps(Q µ ℓ) be the inverse supply function. Market clearing gives Ps(Q∗ µ ℓ) =
Pd(Q∗ µ), with market clearing price p∗ = p∗(µ ℓ) and quantity Q∗ = Q∗(µ ℓ). Equilibrium proﬁt of
ﬁrm α may be written as π(p∗ µ α ℓ) or as π(µ α ℓ). Finally, over time ﬁrms invest to improve future
technology: the level of investment i costs r(i), where r is assumed to satisfy r′ ≥ 0 and r′′ ≥ 0.
3.1.3 The Evolution of Technology
A ﬁrm may invest from period to period in research and technological improvement. Technological
improvement is represented by a transition kernel, P(d˜ α | µ α i ℓ), where i is investment. As with
earlier notation, this may alternatively be written as P(d˜ α |  t−ℓ α i): a ﬁrm with technology α may
use investment and the knowledge of technologies in the support of  t−ℓ to develop its technology next
period. This formulation allows for the possibility that a ﬁrm may require investment to achieve the
standards represented by  t−ℓ — it may not be possible for a ﬁrm to eﬀortlessly implement the best
technologies in the support of  t−ℓ.
The key assumptions on the transition kernel are that better ﬁrms are more likely to draw better
technology, more investment improves the chances of drawing a good technology, and less access to
14Given two measures   ν ∈ P(Λ),   dominates ν, written   < ν if and only if for all measurable increasing functions




gdν. (Note that “ ” is an ordering on Λ, and “<” an ordering on P(Λ)). See Appendix III for
further discussion.
15Assume that marginal cost is increasing in q to ensure that the ﬁrst order condition gives a maximum. Furthermore,
assume that both cost, c and the transition kernel, P, are continuous functions of all arguments.
7technology of others worsens the chances of drawing a good technology (T1). Furthermore, technology
can only improve over time (T2), and better technology ﬁrms are more successful innovators (T3).
Formally:
T1. P(d˜ α | µ α i ℓ) is weakly increasing in α, and in i; and weakly decreasing in ℓ.16 Furthermore,
P(d˜ α | µ α i ℓ) is increasing in µ — in the sense that if µ′ dominates µ coordinate-wise, then
other things equal, a better distribution is drawn conditional on µ′ than µ. Better technology or
higher investment improve next periods distribution; longer patent life reduces access to technology
so can only worsen next periods distribution.
T2. If α′ ∈ supp P(  | µ α i ℓ), then α′   α, where given a measure υ on Λ, supp υ is the support of
υ.
T3. The marginal productivity of investment weakly increases with α. For any continuous increasing
monotone function g on Λ:17
α′   α implies
Z
g(˜ α)∆iP(d˜ α | µt α′ i ℓ) ≥
Z
g(˜ α)∆iP(d˜ α | µt α i ℓ)  (1)
The investment strategies of ﬁrms in conjunction with the transition kernel, P, move the state of the
system forward over time. This is discussed in the next section.
Remark 1. Thus, improvement in technology overall results from the ﬂow of individual discoveries —
with each individual discovery insigniﬁcant relative to the overall volume of discovery. One possible
extension of this model is to allow for “paradigm shift” discoveries which revolutionize an industry —
in the way, for example, that the Mosaic web browser revolutionized internet use. The formulation
used here can accommodate such an extension provided that big breakthroughs are unanticipated. In
such a formulation, there is positive probability of a breakthrough discovery in any period (some ﬁrm
will have a major discovery or development), but no single ﬁrm can guarantee that it will have such a
discovery with positive probability. In this case, revolutionary innovations are unanticipated and hence
don’t aﬀect the investment incentives of ﬁrms.
3.1.4 Firms Strategies and the Evolution of Technology.
Firms strategies are represented by a joint distribution, τ, on (i α) ∈ I × A, written τ ∈ M(I ×
A). Conditioning on α, τ(di | α), gives the distribution over investment of ﬁrm α. Given the extant
distribution over technologies is  , for consistency, if τ ∈ M(I ×A) the marginal distribution of τ on A
should coincide with  : margAτ =  . Let C( ) = {τ | margAτ =  }, the set of distributions on I × A
with marginal   on A. The distribution of technologies evolves as:
 t+1( ) =
Z
it αt
P(  | µt αt it ℓ)τt(dit | αt) t(dαt) =
Z
it αt
P(  | µt αt it ℓ)τt(dit × dαt)  (2)
16For example, α′   α implies that P(d˜ α | µ α′ i ℓ) < P(d˜ α | µ α i ℓ).
17Assume that 1
i′−i[P(d˜ α | µt α i′ ℓ) −P(d˜ α | µt α i ℓ)] converges weakly to a signed measure ∆iP(d˜ α | µt α i ℓ) as
i′ → i.
8So, given the current distribution on technologies,  t, if αt invests according to the strategy τt(  | αt),
then next period the aggregate distribution on technologies is given by  t+1. The distribution  t+1( )
depends on µt, ℓ, τt and  t. This may be made explicit by writing:
 t+1( ) = ϕt 1(  | µt τt ℓ)  τt ∈ M(I × A) (3)
where τt ∈ C( t). Appendix I describes in detail the evolution of the individual and aggregate distribu-
tions over time.
4 Welfare and Eﬃciency.
In this environment, welfare is most naturally evaluated by the sum of consumer and producer surplus,
and in the multi-period context by the present value of the surplus ﬂow. Letting {p∗
t} be the sequence of
market clearing prices, the present value of consumer surplus is given by
P∞
t=1 δt−1[Pd(Qt µt) − p∗
t] =
PVcs. Proﬁt net of investment cost for ﬁrm αt is [π(µt αt ℓ)−r(it)] and the present value, aggregating
over all ﬁrms is PVps =
P∞
t=1 δt−1 R
[π(µt αt ℓ) − r(it)]τt(dit | αt) t(dαt). Together, these equal the
discounted sum of the areas between the supply and demand curves. So, the welfare at time t generated
in the market in equilibrium, as measured by total surplus, is given by:
PVts(µt ℓ) = PVcs + PVps  (4)
Equivalently, this is measured by the present value of the area between demand and supply each period,
less investment. Let




[Pd(Q µ) − Ps(Q µ ℓ)]dQ   (5)
and deﬁne a Bellman equation on surplus:




r(i)dτ + δV (µ′ ℓ)} (6)
where µ′ = ( ′ µ), with  ′ determined according to equation (2):  ′( ) =
R
P(  | α µ i ℓ)τ(di × dα).
Equation (6) gives the surplus generated under optimal choice of aggregate investment each period,
where the optimizing τ is the current period investment strategy across all ﬁrms. Deﬁne
C∗( ) = {τ = (τ1 τ2    ) | margΛτt =  t   1 =     t+1 =
Z
P(  | µt αt it ℓ)τt(dit × dαt)  t ≥ 1} (7)
giving those sequences (τ1 τ2    ) of feasible strategies — consistent with the initial aggregate distribu-
tion. With this notation, the value function may be written:

















ˆ V (µ τ ℓ) (8)
where µ is deﬁned inductively from   =  1 and τ = (τ1 τ2     ), according to equation (2) (and see
equation 18 in the appendix), and where ˆ V (µ τ ℓ) is the present value of the surplus ﬂow from the
strategy τ with initial distribution   =  1. Let PVsoc = V (µ ℓ), the present value of total surplus under
the welfare maximizing policy.
Taking the current period to be t, one may consider the impact of varying the current strategy,
τt. Regardless of other period strategies, optimality requires that there is no within period variation
producing a positive change in the present value of surplus. In particular, consider the impact of varying
τt in the direction ∆τt = (τ′
t − τt): ˜ τt = τt + ǫ∆τt = (1 − ǫ)τt + ǫτ′
t. Write ˜ τ for the resulting aggregate





￿ˆ V (µ  ˜ τ ℓ) − ˆ V (µ τ ℓ)
￿
≤ 0 (9)
This computation leads to theorem 1.
Remark 2. To simplify calculations, theorem 1 considers the case where Pd(Q µ) is independent of µ
so that only the supply curve shifts in response to distributional changes. Also, for ease of notation,
write zs for (αs is).
In theorem 1 the impact of a variation in the aggregate distribution, τt is broken into three compo-
nents: the eﬀect of the resulting aggregate variation on cost and on the transition kernel, and the direct
variation on proﬁt accruing to each ﬁrm.









t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt) + ∂Tπt+j(p∗
t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt)
o












t+j µt+j αt it ℓ) −
Z
zt+j




∆τt(dit | αt) t(dαt) ≤ 0 (10)
where ∂Cπt+j, ∂Tπt+j and ¯ πt+j capture the impact of current investment on future proﬁt in period t+j
arising from:
1. cost reduction (∂Cπt+j) through improvement in aggregate technology,
2. improvement in aggregate technology at the length of the patent period (∂Tπt+j), and
3. direct impact (¯ πt+j), from improvement in technology due to the change in investment ∆τt(di | α).
(All proofs are in appendix II.)
10In the optimization problem faced by the individual ﬁrm (discussed below in section 4.1), the terms in
∂Cπ and ∂Tπ in expression (10) do not appear — since these result from variations in the aggregate
distributions. This results in a divergence between social and private interests which is discussed further
there. The expression ¯ πt+j in the third term has the form:
¯ πt+j(p
∗






t+j µt+j αt+j ℓ)ψt j(dαt+j | αt it ℓ) (11)
and this represents the proﬁt gain directly resulting from investment variation, and the only component
to appear in the individual optimization calculation.
Remark 3. In the full computation, taking into account the dependence of Pd on µ, an additional group
of terms appear since aggregate distribution shifts “grow” demand and increase welfare.
The welfare optimization considered in equation (6) or (8) determines the socially optimal investment
policy for a given patent life ℓ. From the social planner perspective, increasing patent length creates
ineﬃciency since it restricts the use of best available technology. The socially optimal patent length, ℓ,
is zero where all knowledge is fully utilized.
Theorem 2. The socially optimal value of ℓ is ℓ = 0.
The logic for the result is simple: other things equal, a reduction in patent length beneﬁts each
ﬁrm in terms of cost reduction and improvement in innovation, leading to an increase in output and an
outward shift in supply (each period) raising surplus. So, the impact eﬀect of the reduction in ℓ is to
raise surplus, prior to optimization over the aggregate distribution, which can only raise surplus further.
Thus, PVsoc
def = V (µ l) is maximized at ℓ = 0. Viewing PVsoc as a function of patent length, PVsoc(ℓ)
is plotted in ﬁgure 3.
4.1 The Divergence of Public and Private Incentives
The discussion above considers necessary conditions for optimality of the aggregate investment strategy.
In those computations, in addition to the direct eﬀects of investment change, the externality eﬀects from
the beneﬁt of creating know-how appear in the terms ∂Cπ and ∂Tπ in equation (10). The following
discussion separates these components. From the perspective of an individual ﬁrm α, the aggregate dis-
tribution over time is a parameter in the optimization problem, which involves a sequence of investment
output decisions {it qt}. At each point in time, the period t output decision is chosen as in the one
period model and can be eliminated from the problem, leaving investment as the sole choice variable.
Fix an aggregate strategy sequence τt = {τs}∞
s=t. This determines the aggregate distribution going
forward in time (µt+1, µt+2    ). For a ﬁrm with technology αs at time s, let the investment strategy
be τs(di | αs), so that from period t, the present value of net revenue with this strategy is, at time t:
π(p∗





t+1 µt+1 αt+1 ℓ) − r(it+1)τt+1(dit+1 | αt+1)]P(dαt+1 | µt αt it ℓ) + δ2    
Given τt = {τs}∞
s=t and suppressing aggregate variables in the notation, let the j-period ahead distri-
bution be ψt j(dαt+j | αt it l) (see section 3.1.4 and appendix I), so the full expression may be written:
π(p∗







t+j µt+j αt+j ℓ) − r(it+j)τt+j(dit+j | αt+j)}ψt j(dαt+j | αt it ℓ)   (12)
In market equilibrium, ﬁrm α maximizes this expression by choice of i (at each period).
Remark 4. In contrast with equation (10), in the competitive equilibrium individually optimal behavior
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o
τt(dit | αt) > 0 
is ignored.18
In general, the market equilibrium is not socially optimal.
Theorem 3. The Social optimum coincides with the market equilibrium if and only if
∂Cπt+j = ∂Tπt+j = 0  j ≥ 1
From equation (10), the terms ∂Cπt+j and ∂Tπt+j represent the (positive) externalities for individual
ﬁrms (from aggregate distributional improvements). The only remaining term is the direct eﬀect on the
ﬁrms proﬁt from investment. These terms, ∂Cπt+j and ∂Tπt+j, are 0 when shifts in the aggregate
technology distribution have no impact on individual costs and transition probabilities. For j < ℓ this
is always the case since new innovations of others cannot be used; and 0 for j > ℓ when the evolution
of technology is fast — so that what is in the public domain is completely outdated. Thus, social
optimality coincides with the competitive outcome only when there are no externality beneﬁts in either
cost reduction or technological development. (The proof in appendix II formalizes these remarks.)
18Where, for ease of notation:
∂C+Tπt+j(p∗
t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt) = ∂Cπt+j(p∗
t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt) + ∂Tπt+j(p∗
t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt)
12With externalities associated with patented information, at ℓ = 0, ∂Cπt+j  = 0 and ∂Tπt+j  = 0 for
some j ≥ 1, in which case the social optimum diﬀers from the market equilibrium outcome. However,
when ℓ is large, information is old before it comes into the public domain for public use. In environments
where there is rapid technological progress, old information is useless — in the sense that the technologies
of that vintage are superseded by the current technology of any ﬁrm.
With a patent life of ℓ periods, the distribution of ﬁrm αt’s technology at time t + 1 given by
P(  | ( t     t−ℓ+1 :  t−ℓ    ) αt i ℓ) 
so that at time t, all technologies in existence at time t − l are publicly available as inputs in research
and development.
Deﬁnition 1. Say that the pace of innovation is fast relative to patent life if
αt ∈ supp  t and ˜ α ∈ supp P(  | µt αt it ℓ) implies that ˜ α   α′  ∀ α′ ∈ supp  t−ℓ+1 
If the pace of evolution of technology is fast, then the technology drawn for time t + 1 (based on own
technology αt and publicly available information  t−l) dominates technologies that become publicly
available at time t − ℓ + 1 in the sense that any αt+1 that has positive probability of being drawn at
time t + 1 satisﬁes αt+1   ˆ α, ∀ˆ α ∈ supp  t−ℓ+1.
Theorem 4. If the pace of innovation is fast, then competitive equilibrium is socially optimal, relative
to the ﬁxed patent life, ℓ.
In this case, the positive externality value of investment is 0, and the market outcome coincides with
the socially optimal outcome. When ℓ is suﬃciently large patents protect technology or knowledge that
is worthless, so that PVsoc(ℓ) is constant as ℓ increases (See ﬁgure (3)).
5 Welfare and Patent Length.
The eﬀect of lengthening patent life is to reduce the publicly available technology. What is the impact of
such a change on welfare? Because the socially optimal level of investment is higher than that arising in
competitive equilibrium, whether lengthening patent length is beneﬁcial or not depends on the impact
such changes have on investment. The results to follow identify two cases. When low technology ﬁrms
are more dependent than high technology ﬁrms on the use of technology outside the patent period then,
subject to conditions, the impact of lengthening patent life is to force those ﬁrms to greater research
eﬀort (by depriving them of of access to previously unrestricted technology.) And, this has a knock-on
eﬀect of increasing the competitive pressure on good ﬁrms, forcing them to also raise investment. As a
result, overall investment in R&D increases and raises social welfare. In the second case, low technology
ﬁrms make relatively less use of technology outside the patent period. Then, lengthening the patent
period has greater impact on, and inhibits the better technology ﬁrms, by reducing the beneﬁts from
and incentives to being “good”. In this case the overall impact is to lower social welfare. These results
13suggest that patents are beneﬁcial when, as a result of the need to compete, they spur R&D and hence
innovation. To the extent that disallowing a ﬁrm to use the discovery of others ultimately forces that
ﬁrm to greater investment in R&D the eﬀect of patents is beneﬁcial.
For subsequent discussion, it is useful to write the present value at time t of the payoﬀ ﬂow to a
ﬁrm, α, optimizing in each period from this point on as: v(µ(t) α ℓ), where µ(t) = (µt µt+1), so the
individual optimization problem may expressed in a Bellman equation as:




t µt α ℓ) − r(it) + δ
Z
v(µ(t + 1)  ˜ α ℓ)P(d˜ α) | µt α i ℓ)} (13)
The value function is parametrized by the aggregate distribution sequence, µ(t), which is determined
in equilibrium, but taken as ﬁxed by individual ﬁrms. Note that the function v is increasing in α: a
ﬁrm with higher α can imitate the investment strategy of one with lower α but enjoy lower cost and
stochastically better technology draws.
Assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst order condition at the solution is:






v(µ(t + 1)  ˜ α ℓ)[P(d˜ α | µt α i′ ℓ) − P(d˜ α | µt α i ℓ)] = 0




v(µ(t + 1)  ˜ α ℓ)∆iP(˜ α | µt α i ℓ) = 0  (14)





v(µ(t + 1)  ˜ α ℓ)∆iiP(d˜ α | µt α i ℓ) < 0  (15)
Considering equation (14), −r′(i) + δ
R
˜ α v(µ(t + 1)  ˜ α ℓ)∆iP(˜ α | µt α i ℓ) = 0, a consequence of as-
sumption T3 is that the optimal value of i increases in α.
In the model developed here, improvements in technology have three eﬀects: demand rises, cost de-
creases as all ﬁrms avail of technology improvements; and each ﬁrm becomes more eﬃcient as advances in
technology raise the ﬁrms ability to make technology improvements. The ﬁrst two eﬀects unambiguously
beneﬁt all ﬁrms. The third eﬀect increases competition directly because each ﬁrm is more eﬃcient. The
following assumption is that the net eﬀect is positive — the value of each ﬁrm rises.
P1. v(µ(t) α ℓ) is increasing in µt: if ¯ µ(t) = (¯ µt  ¯  t  ¯  t+1    ) dominates ˆ µ(t) = (ˆ µt  ˆ  t+1    )
component-wise, then v(¯ µ(t) α ℓ) ≥ v(ˆ µ(t) α ℓ) for all α.20





[∆iP(B | µt α i′ ℓ) − ∆iP(B | µt α i ℓ)] converges weakly to a
signed measure, ∆iiP(  | µt α i ℓ), as i′ → i.
20In the n-ﬁrm linear oligopoly model with demand P(Q) = a − bQ and constant marginal cost, c, proﬁt of ﬁrm i
is πi = ( 1
n+1)2(
(a−c)2
b ), which is increases as c decreases. In the speciﬁc context here, improving technology increases
demand and supply, but also lowers production cost. If, for example, the net impact is to maintain or raise market price,
P1 will be satisﬁed.
14Remark 5. Recall that the market clearing price is determined by: p∗ = Pd(Q µ) = Ps(Q µ ℓ). If
demand depends only on current technology  t, and with T1, cost depends only on the distributions
 t and  t−l, then market clearing price, p∗( t  t−ℓ ℓ), is determined at time t according to p∗ =
Pd(Q  t) = Ps(Q  t  t−ℓ ℓ), and proﬁt may be written: π(p∗  t  t−ℓ αt ii ℓ) = π(p∗ µt αt ii ℓ). If
(a) p∗( t  t−ℓ ℓ) ≥ p∗( ′
t  t−ℓ ℓ) when  t <  ′
t, so that better technology pushes up the equilibrium
price, and (b) π(p∗  t  t−ℓ αt ii ℓ) ≥ π(p∗  t  ′
t−ℓ αt ii ℓ) when  t−ℓ <  ′
t−ℓ, so that an improvement
in cost due to an “across the board” technological improvement raises proﬁt, then P1 is satisﬁed.
5.1 Patented Knowledge as a Substitute in Cost Reduction and Innovation.
When the (negative) impact of lengthening patent life is greatest on low technology ﬁrms, good tech-
nology may be considered a substitute for the patented information. Furthermore, if increasing patent
length raises the marginal product of investment, then investment also serves as a substitute for patented
information. These assumptions are formalized in the following two conditions:







Ib. Increasing patent life raises the marginal productivity of investment. For g increasing, if ℓ′ ≥ ℓ,
Z
˜ α




g(˜ α)∆iP(d˜ α | µ α i ℓ) 
Figure 1 illustrates these assumptions (Since α is not a real number, “α” denotes an axis of ordered
α’s). An implication of (Ia.) is that the loss of technologies excluded by patents has a greater negative
impact on weak or low technology ﬁrms. Condition (Ib.) implies that reducing the access of any ﬁrm, α,
to patented technology raises the marginal productivity of investment by α. Together, these conditions
imply that there is greater pressure on weak ﬁrms to improve in terms of proﬁtability; and there is
greater pay-back to investment after improvement.
When increases in patent life aﬀects good ﬁrms less than bad ﬁrms and when increased length of patent
protection raises the marginal value of investment then increased patent protection raises welfare.
Theorem 5. Under assumptions T1, T2, T3, P1, Ia and Ib, lengthening patent life improves the
aggregate distributions in successive periods and raises the present value of surplus.
Let PVS or PVS(ℓ) be the surplus in competitive equilibrium (in the substitutes case.) As ℓ varies,
so does the value of surplus, and, when the substitutes condition is satisﬁed, an increase in ℓ leads to
21 ∂v(µ(t) α ℓ)
∂ℓ measures the marginal impact on the present value of ﬁrm α, when ℓ changes but the aggregate distributions
on technology over time remain ﬁxed. Recall that v(µ(t)  α ℓ) gives the present value payoﬀ to α optimizing over time
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Figure 1: Patented Knowledge Substitutable for Technology and Investment
an increase in investment and hence raises welfare. The curve PVS in ﬁgure 3 depicts this case. The
next section considers the opposite case — where knowledge is complementary to innovation and cost
reduction.
5.2 Patented Knowledge as a Complement in Cost Reduction and Innova-
tion.
The eﬀect of lengthening patent life is to reduce the publicly available technology. When the impact
of this is greatest on high technology ﬁrms, good technology is complemented by the patented informa-
tion. Furthermore, if increasing patent length reduces the marginal product of investment, then that
information is also a complement to investment.
So, in contrast to the previous assumptions (Ia.) and (Ib.), suppose instead that better ﬁrms are
more dependent on patented information so that such information is a complement to the quality of a
ﬁrms’ technology. Suppose also that increasing patent length removes from use information which raises
the marginal product of investment — so that such information is complementary to investment. These
conditions are formalized next.







IIb. Increasing patent life reduces the marginal productivity of investment. For g increas-
ing, ℓ′ ≥ ℓ,
Z
˜ α




g(˜ α)∆iP(d˜ α | µ α i ℓ) 
These assumptions are depicted in ﬁgure 2.
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Figure 2: Patented Knowledge Complementary to Technology and Investment
Theorem 6. Under assumptions T1, T2, T3, P1, IIa and IIb, lengthening patent life worsens the
aggregate distributions in successive periods and reduces the present value of surplus.
As in the earlier discussion write PVC or PVC(ℓ) to denote the surplus in competitive equilibrium
(in the complements case.) In contrast to the substitutes case, here an increase in ℓ leads to a decrease
in investment and hence reduces welfare. The curve PVC in ﬁgure 3 depicts this case.
5.3 Welfare comparisons and welfare improvement
Summarizing the previous discussion, when patented information is a substitute for both technology and
(the need for) investment then increasing patent life reduces access to that information and forces ﬁrms
to greater investment, raising social welfare. In the complementary case, the opposite is true: these











Figure 3: Welfare as patent length varies
In the substitutes case, increasing patent life raises the value of having good technology (hence
encouraging investment indirectly), and raises the direct value of investment in improving one’s own
22When ℓ is very large, patent protection extends beyond obsolescence and changing ℓ has no impact on societal welfare.
17technology. Hence, increasing patent length raises welfare. In contrast, with complements, it is advan-
tageous to have good technology at the ﬁrm level to beneﬁt from synergies with the available public
technology: capitalizing on this synergy encourages investment to improve one’s own technology. There,
the less available is public technology, the less beneﬁt from private investment. In addition, in the com-
plements case, the direct value of investment is lower since the improvement in own technology is lower
when publicly available technology is older. Thus, the beneﬁt of investment is reduced and these eﬀects
together imply that lengthening patent life reduces welfare.
When these eﬀects conﬂict the consequence of increasing patent life is ambiguous. This occurs, for
example, when increasing patent life has greater (negative) impact on better technology ﬁrms but at the
same time increases the marginal productivity of investment (in generating innovation). In this case,
there is less incentive to improve, but it is easier to do so.
One special case of interest is that where the impact of changing patent length on the marginal
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￿
≈ 0 
In this case, if increasing patent length has a more adverse eﬀect on weaker (low technology) ﬁrms,
then it is welfare improving; and if the eﬀect is greater on stronger ﬁrms, then it is welfare reducing.
In particular, patent policy plays a beneﬁcial role when it forces less technologically advanced ﬁrms to
invest more (by depriving them of the use of others ideas). So, patents are beneﬁcial not because they
encourage reward seeking behavior, but because to survive a ﬁrm is compelled to invest and innovate:
competitive pressure rather than the prize of monopoly spurs research. To the extent that one may
extrapolate from these observations a scheme that gives (payoﬀ) advantage to weak innovators is bad
from a welfare perspective. On the other hand, patents are detrimental to welfare when the direct
negative eﬀect from lengthening patent live is greatest for the better technology ﬁrms, since it reduces
the incentive to invest.
5.3.1 Welfare Improvement
Standard tax-subsidy schemes provide welfare improving incentives (with the implicit presumption that
policy makers have full information on the costs and beneﬁts of innovation). Given a prevailing patent
regime, provided innovation is not fast relative to patent life, an investment subsidy and lump sum tax
can improve welfare. The follow result makes this assertion at a patent life of 0.
Theorem 7. Suppose that ℓ = 0. Then there is an individual speciﬁc pricing scheme that raises welfare
and is self ﬁnancing.
However, in practice such schemes may not be practical and are not common as a welfare improving
device. The central problem resulting from the delay in having discovery widely used is that the gain
to a ﬁrm from holding exclusive rights to discovery, is less than the potential gain to society from
having immediate access to the discovery. The compensation required to give the developing ﬁrm
18the necessary incentives is less that the overall value to society. In principle all ﬁrms together would
be willing, as a group, to pay suﬃcient compensation to reward the discoverer’s eﬀort in return for
access to the discovery. How can this be achieved? The most commonly discussed method of making
patented discovery available is through licensing: the discoverer makes available use of the innovation
for a fee, and the revenue obtained in this way outweighs cost from loss of control over the use of the
innovation. Licensing is incorporated in [13] so that when licencing is necessary because of infringement
the incremental proﬁt is divided so that all involved parties have non-negative share. There, innovation
improves quality, q, with a discovery producing a jump, ∆, in quality. In [10] the holdup potential of
licensing is examined.
In the framework developed here licencing is complex because the value of innovation from period to
period is correlated across ﬁrms: it is the overall improvement that matters, rather that any individual
discovery. And because technology is multidimensional, diﬀerent ﬁrms may add value along diﬀerent
dimensions so that the valuation of the individual contribution to overall discovery from period to
period is diﬃcult or impossible to ascertain. In this case licencing may be diﬃcult to implement since it
is a “batch” of discoveries rather that any speciﬁc one that matters and there is no natural bargaining
mechanism for ﬁrms to resolve such issues, especially when the number of ﬁrms is large. This observation
may well be reﬂected in practice with the increasing litigation over ownership of ideas.
6 Conclusion
The traditional argument for patents is that they encourage innovation by giving the innovator monopoly
power for a period of time: monopoly rights create the incentive to invest so that innovation in the
aggregate is greater that it would be in the absence of patents. In the environment here, individual
innovations are important to the ﬁrm but alone not signiﬁcant in the overall pool of discovery from
period to period. The synergy from the pooling of innovation is what creates the externality value
in discovery. But the patent blocks the innovator from beneﬁting from that pool of discovery. While
the patent system cannot achieve an eﬃcient outcome for the market — because some of the positive
externalities cannot be internalized, this blocking eﬀect can have either a positive or a negative impact
on overall innovation and welfare. Whether patents improve or worsen overall welfare depends on the
exact way in which innovation interacts with investment and ﬁrm quality (as discussed in (5.1) and
(5.2)).
This discussion focuses entirely on the incentive eﬀects that arise from obtaining monopoly rights
on innovation when there are large numbers of innovators. In particular, the prospect of licensing is
not considered. One might argue that somehow the positive externalities might be internalized by the
ﬁrms in the market. However, as mentioned above, there are good reasons to expect that this might not
happen. Large numbers of innovators make reaching consensus on sharing of innovation diﬃcult, but
beyond this, the overlap in discovery within period and the dependent evolution of discovery over time
make it diﬃcult if not impossible to price individual innovations and hence allocate value to ideas. So,
while possibility exists that a market might develop to price each innovators discoveries, it is questionable
19as to whether or not this would occur.
20Appendix I: Evolution of technology distributions
With a view to developing a recursion, recall from equations (2) and (3):
 t+1( ) = ϕt 1(  | µt τt ℓ) = ϕt 1(  | µt τ
t ℓ)  (16)
where for notational convenience, τt = (τt τt+1    ), is the sequence of distributional strategies going
forward in time, and where ϕt 1(  | µt τt ℓ) has τt as an argument to allow for dependence of the j
period ahead aggregate distribution on values of τt beyond t. Similarly,
ψt 1(  | µt τt αt it ℓ) = P(  | µt αt it ℓ)  (17)
So, ψt 1 gives the distribution over technology that ﬁrm αt, investing it, will draw from next period.
Aggregating across individual ﬁrms yields the aggregate distribution on technologies.
 t+1( ) = ϕt 1(  | µt τt ℓ) =
Z
αt it
ψt 1(  | µt τ
t αt it ℓ)τt(dit | αt) t(dαt) (18)
From equation (2 or 16), observe that  t+1 is determined by µt and τt. Going forward,  t+1 is determined
by µt, τt and τt+1. And so on. Let µt+j(τt) = µt+j = (µt  t+1      t+j−1  t+j), with  t = margAτt,
 t+1 determined according to the iteration in equation (16), and { t+j}j>1 deﬁned inductively. Going
forward one period, deﬁne
ψt 2(  | µt+1(τ
t) τ




P(  | µt+1 αt+1 it+1 ℓ)τt+1(dit+1 | αt+1)ψt 1(  | µt τ
t αt it ℓ) (19)
The distribution ψt 2 gives the the two-period ahead distribution over characteristics for ﬁrm αt investing
it currently and following τt+1 next period. Averaging:
 t+2( ) = ϕt 2(  | µt+1(τt) τt ℓ) =
Z
αt it
ψt 2(  | µt+1(τt) τt αt it ℓ)τt(dit | αt) t(dαt) (20)
Write  t+j+1( ) = ϕt j+1(  | µt+j(τt) τt ℓ) to denote the aggregate distribution at time t + j + 1
given µt and τt; and ψt j+1(  | µt+j(τt) τt αt it ℓ) for the distribution over technology of ﬁrm α, j +1
periods after t conditional on µt and τt. This gives the distribution at time t + j + 1 over technologies
for ﬁrm α investing i at time t and following the investment strategy τt(  |  ) thereafter. The j+1 period
ahead individual distribution is:
ψt j+1(  | µt+j(τt) τt αt it ℓ) =
Z
αt+j it+j
P(  | µt+j αt+j it+j ℓ)τt+j(dit+j | αt+j)ψt j(dαt+j | µt τt αt it ℓ)  (21)
21and the aggregate and individual distributions are related by the formula:
 t+j+1( ) = ϕt j+1(  | µt+j(τt) τt ℓ) =
Z
αt it
ψt j+1(  | µt+j(τt) τt αt it ℓ)τt(dit | αt) t(dαt) (22)
22Appendix II: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: Recall equation 8 in the text:

















ˆ V (µ τ ℓ) (23)
where µ is deﬁned inductively from   =  1 and τ = (τ1 τ2     ), according to equations (2) and (18),
and where ˆ V (µ τ ℓ) is the present value of the surplus ﬂow from the strategy τ with initial distribution
  =  1.
Varying τt in the direction ∆τt = (τ′
t − τt): ˜ τt = τt + ǫ∆τt = (1 − ǫ)τt + ǫτ′
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∆τt(di | αt) t(dαt)
At periods t + 1, t + 2, and so on, the perturbation impacts the aggregate distribution directly; and
from period t+l the transition kernel and cost function are aﬀected as the period t technology becomes
publicly available. The surplus variation at time t+j due to the variation in τt is S(˜ µt+j ℓ)−S(µt+j ℓ).





[S(˜ µt+j ℓ) − S(µt+j ℓ)] 
For the computations to follow, simplify notation by writing ψt j+1 or ψt j+1(dαt+j+1 | αt it) in
place of ψt j+1(dαt+j+1 | µt+j(τt) τt αt it ℓ) from equation (21). Similarly, write ϕt j+1 in place of
ϕt j+1(  | µt+j(τt) τt ℓ) in equation (22). At period t + l, ˜ µt+l = (˜  t+l     ˜  t+1 | µt). The eﬀect of
changing τt is direct from the next period, t + 1, through ˜  t+1 and subsequent aggregate distributions
(according to equations (18) and (22)).




P(  | ( t      t−l+1 |  t−l    ) αt it)τt(dit | αt) t(dαt) (25)
23depends only on the aggregate distribution at time t − l, the most recent vintage of technology that is
freely usable, and which has a role in determining the aggregate distribution at time t + 1. In a similar
manner, the action variation τt → ˜ τt changes  t+1 to ˜  t+1, and this enters as a parameter to aﬀect the
distribution at period t + l + 1 through the transition kernel.
Considering the variation on the supply side at time t + j, since the demand curve does not shift,
the change in area between the curves is approximated by:











t+1) ℓ)dpt+j  
where p∗
t+j is the market clearing price at aggregate distribution ϕt j. Write ∆τt = τ′
t − τt and ˜ τt =
τt + ǫ∆τt. Recalling equations (21) and (22), for j ≥ 1, let
˜ ψt j+1 = ψ
j+1(  | µt+j(˜ τt τ
t+1) (˜ τt τ
t+1) αt it ℓ); ˜ ϕt j+1 = ˜ ϕ
j+1(  | µt+j(˜ τt τ
t+1)  ˜ τt τ
t+1 ℓ) (27)
and put
∆ϕt j = ˜ ϕt j − ϕt j  ∆ψt j = ˜ ψt j − ψt j 
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q(p αt+j µt+j(τt τ
t+1) ℓ)ψt j(dαt+j | αt it)τt(dit | αt) t(dαt) dp
For simplicity, write q(pt+j µt+j αt+j ℓ) = q(p µt+j(˜ τt τt+1) αt+j ℓ) to denote the time t + j supply
of ﬁrm αt+j at price p, given the time t aggregate distribution τt. Similarly, write ˜ µt+j = µt+j(˜ τt τt+1),
and ˜ µt+j = µt+j(˜ τt τt+1). And, taking τt+1 as ﬁxed throughout the discussion so that replacing






























q(p µt+j αt+j ℓ)ψt j(dαt+j | αt it)τt(dit | αt) t(dαt) dp
24Rearranging with ˜ ψt j







































































q(p  ˜ µt+j αt+j ℓ) ˜ ψt+j(dαt+j | αt it)∆τt(dit | αt) t(dαt)dp





























q(p  ˜ µt+j αt+j ℓ)dp ˜ ψt j(dαt+j | αt it)∆τt(dit | αt) t(dαt)  











t+j − cq(q  ˜ µt+j αt+j ℓ)]dq = π(p
∗
t+j  ˜ µt+j αt+j ℓ) 
where q∗








t+j  ˜ µt+j αt+j ℓ) − π(p∗
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t+j  ˜ µt+j αt+j ℓ) − π(p
∗






t+j τt + ǫ∆τt αt+j ℓ) − π(p∗
t+j αt+j τt ℓ)]
= Dπ(p
∗













t+j µt+j αt+j ℓ)∆ψt j(dαt+j | αt it) 
Consider the terms in (28) in turn. Deﬁne
∂Cπt+j(p∗





t+j µt+j αt+j ℓ | ∆τt)ψt j(dαt+j | αt it ℓ)  (30)
This gives the expected variation in proﬁt to αt resulting from cost reduction at time t+j arising from
the innovation generated by the aggregate distribution shift ∆τt as the discovery becomes publicly usable.
Similarly, let ∂Tπt+j denote the impact on proﬁt of an expected improvement in technology draw at
time t+j resulting from the perturbation of the transition kernel by the shift in the aggregate distribution:
∂Tπt+j(p∗





t+j µt+j αt+j ℓ)δψt j(dαt+j | αt it ℓ) (31)
The remaining term gives the direct eﬀect on period t + j proﬁt of the investment change in period t,
denoted ∂Dπt+j and deﬁned:
¯ πt+j(p
∗


















t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt) + ∂Tπt+j(p
∗
t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt)
o






t+j µt+j αt it ℓ)∆τt(dit | αt) t(dαt)
26The remaining eﬀect to be considered is the direct eﬀect on future investment. At period t + j, this is
given by:
R
zt+j r(it+j)τt+j(dit+j | αt+j)ψt j(dαt+j | αt it l)
￿

















t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt) + ∂Tπt+j(p∗
t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt)
o




















∆τt(dit | αt) t(dαt)
Where τ = (τ1(  | α)    τt(  | α)    ) and ˜ τ is deﬁned from τ by replacing τt(  | α) with ˜ τt(  | α).
















t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt) + ∂Tπt+j(p∗
t+j µt+j αt it ℓ | ∆τt)
o









t+j µt+j αt it ℓ) −
Z
zt+j
r(it+j)τt+j(dit+j | αt+j)ψt j(dαt+j | αt it l)
−r(it)
o
∆τt(dit | αt) t(dαt)
This gives the variation appearing in the statement of the theorem. Optimality requires that all feasible
variations produce non-positive surplus variation.
Proof of theorem 2: Proﬁt is (weakly) declining in ℓ because cost is weakly increasing in ℓ, and for
ℓ′ ≥ ℓ the transition kernel satisﬁes P(  | µ α i ℓ′) < P(  | µ α i ℓ) in ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
From the former, period surplus declines (other things equal), and from the latter, other things equal,
the aggregate technology distribution is worse each period, moving the supply inward. Considering the
change in surplus from a variation in ℓ (instead if τt), keeping all else constant:









Qs(p (µt+j(τt τt+1) ℓ)dpt+j  
If ˜ ℓ < ℓ, then ∆St+j > 0 — because with an unchanged investment strategy individual output will be
higher and aggregate supply pushed out, increasing surplus. Thus, at ˜ ℓ surplus must be higher when
the present value of surplus is optimized at ˜ ℓ. Hence, lowering ℓ lowers surplus and so the optimal value
27of ℓ is 0.
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t+j µt+j αt+j ℓ) − r(it+j)τt+j(dit+j | αt+j)]∆iψt j(dαt+j | αt it ℓ) = 0  (37)
If it(αt) solves this expression, deﬁne ˆ τt as the measure with marginal  t and support on the set {(it αt) |
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τ(dit | αt) (dαt)
the measure ˆ τt is a solution. Conversely, if ¯ τt maximizes (38), then for  t-almost all αt, almost all it in
the support of ¯ τt(  | αt) maximize (36).
In the market equilibrium, ﬁrms calculate the beneﬁt of innovation ignoring the long-term eﬀect
on aggregate innovation and cost. The social beneﬁt of investment exceeds the private beneﬁt by the
ﬁrst two terms in equation (10). Comparing expressions (10) and (36), when ∂Cπt+j = ∂Tπt+j = 0 in
expression (10), both have the same solution.
Proof of theorem 4: In view of the previous theorem, the terms ∂Cπt+j and ∂Tπt+j are 0 in the social
planner optimization in equation (10).





v(µ(t + 1)  ˜ α ℓ)∆iP(d˜ α | µt α i ℓ) ≡ 0
the marginal impact on ﬁrm αt (ignoring the impact on equilibrium of a variation in ℓ) is obtained by

























˜ α vℓ(µ(t + 1)  ˜ α ℓ)∆iP(d˜ α | µt α i ℓ) + δ
R
˜ α v(µ(t + 1)  ˜ α ℓ)∆liP(d˜ α | µt α i ℓ)
r′′(it) − δ
R
˜ α v(µ(t + 1)  ˜ α ℓ)∆iiP(d˜ α | µt α i ℓ)
(40)
From the second order condition, the denominator is positive, so the sign of dit
dℓ is the same as that of
the numerator. Assumption Ib implies that
R
˜ α v(µ(t)  ˜ α ℓ)∆liP(˜ α | µt α i ℓ) > 0 and in view of T2, Ia
implies that
R
˜ α vℓ(µ(t)  ˜ α ℓ)∆iP(˜ α | µt α i ℓ) > 0. Consequently using (Ia,b), dit
dℓ > 0.
These calculations ignore the impact of changes in investment behavior on the aggregate distribution.




v(µ(t)  ˜ α ℓ)∆iP(d˜ α | µt α i ℓ) 




v(µ(t)  ˜ α ℓ′)∆iP(d˜ α | µt α i′ ℓ′) 
However, higher investment will impact µt, raising the quality of the aggregate distribution next period.
From T3, better technology ﬁrms invest more, so that the distribution is better in subsequent periods.
This leads to a (weak) decrease in each ﬁrms’ cost and an improvement in the technology draw next
period. Both of these eﬀects work to raise v so that the resulting value function satisﬁes:







v(µ(t)  ˜ α ℓ






′(t)  ˜ α ℓ
′)∆iP(d˜ α | ¯ µ′t  ˜ α i
′ ℓ
′) 
To restore equality, i must rise (further) with consequent (further) impact on the aggregate distribution.
Assuming r′(x) is suﬃciently large for large values of x, the iterative process will eventually converge
to equilibrium. Consequently the impact of increasing ℓ is to raise the aggregate distribution quality in
subsequent periods and hence the present value of surplus (welfare).
29Proof of theorem 6: Assumption IIb implies that
R
˜ α v(µ(t)  ˜ α ℓ)∆liP(˜ α | µt α i ℓ) < 0 and in view
of T2, Ia implies that
R
˜ α vℓ(µ(t)  ˜ α ℓ)∆iP(˜ α | µt α i ℓ) < 0. Consequently using (IIa,b), dit
dℓ < 0.
As before, these calculations ignore the impact of changes in investment behavior on the aggregate





v(µ(t)  ˜ α ℓ)∆iP(˜ α | µt α i ℓ) 




v(µ(t)  ˜ α ℓ′)∆iP(˜ α | µt α i′ ℓ′) 
Again, this expression ignores the fact that lower investment will impact µt, reducing the quality of
the aggregate distribution in future periods. This leads to a (weak) increase in each ﬁrms’ cost and a
disimprovement in the technology draw next period. Both of these eﬀects work to reduce v so that the
resulting value function satisﬁes





v(µ′(t)  ˜ α ℓ′)∆iP( ¯ µ′t)  ˜ α i′ ℓ′) < δ
Z
˜ α
v(¯ µt  ˜ α ℓ′)∆iP(˜ α | µt α i′ ℓ′) = r′(i′) 
To restore equality, i must fall (further) with consequent (further) impact on the aggregate distribution.
If r′′(0) is suﬃciently small, the iterative process will eventually converge to equilibrium. Consequently
the impact of increasing ℓ is to worsen the aggregate distribution quality in subsequent periods and
hence reduce the present value of surplus (welfare).
Proof of theorem 7: Consider a deterministic investment variation with ∆τt = τ′
t − τt and with τ′
t
and τ′
t having degenerate conditional distributions at each αt: τ′
t(di | αt) has support i′(αt) and τ′
t has
support i(αt) — so that ∆τt(di | αt) = i′(αt) −i(αt). Also, take τ′
t(di | αt) to have 0 mass outside a set







t+j τt αt i(αt) ℓ | ∆τt)
o
αt ∈ A∗
0  αt  ∈ A∗
The subsidy pays ρ(αt) per unit if investment is between i(αt) and i′(αt) and 0 otherwise. In addition,
ﬁrm αt pays a ﬁxed cost of f(αt) = ρ(αt)[i′(αt)−i(αt)]. With this scheme, ﬁrm αt ∈ A∗ optimizes with
investment equal to i′(αt). Given the ﬁxed cost, the welfare of ﬁrms in A∗ is unchanged. However, with










t+j τt αt it ℓ | ∆τt)
o
τt(dit | αt) > 0  (41)
total welfare is raised.
31Appendix III: Dominance
For the following review, take as given: (a1) Λ, a completely regular topological space (for example, Λ a
metric space), (a2) BΛ the Borel ﬁeld on Λ, (b)  , an order on Λ (reﬂexive, transitive and antisymmetric),
(c) Cb(Λ), the set of continuous bounded real-valued functions on Λ, (d) M+(Λ), the set of non-negative
measures on Λ, and (e) P(Λ) the set of probability measures on Λ. (A topological space Λ is completely
regular if and only if when A is closed in Λ and α  ∈ A, there is a continuous function, f, f : Λ → [0 1]
such that f(α) = 0 and f(A) = 1.)
Deﬁnition 2. A real valued function f : Λ → ℜ is called increasing if α′   α implies that f(α′) ≥ f(α)
(and decreasing if α′   α implies that f(α′) ≤ f(α)). Write Im(Λ) for the set of increasing measurable
functions on Λ.
A set B ⊆ Λ is called increasing if x y ∈ Λ, x ∈ B and y   x imply that y ∈ B.
Deﬁnition 3. Given   ν ∈ P(Λ), deﬁne a pre-ordering (reﬂexive and transitive relation) on P(Λ):




f(α)ν(dα)  ∀f ∈ Im(Λ)
The natural generalization of a result on dominance in ℜ is (see Torres[31]):
Theorem 8.     ν if and only if  (A) ≥ ν(A) for every increasing measurable set A.
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